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Abstract
Deep learning has been widely utilized in many computer vi-
sion applications and achieved remarkable commercial suc-
cess. However, running deep learning models on mobile de-
vices is generally challenging due to limitation of the avail-
able computing resources. It is common to let the users send
their service requests to cloud servers that run the large-scale
deep learning models to process. Sending the data associated
with the service requests to the cloud, however, impose risks
on the user data privacy. Some prior arts proposed sending the
features extracted from raw data (e.g., images) to the cloud.
Unfortunately, these extracted features can still be exploited
by attackers to recover raw images and to infer embedded pri-
vate attributes (e.g., age, gender, etc.). In this paper, we pro-
pose an adversarial training framework DeepObfuscator that
can prevent extracted features from being utilized to recon-
struct raw images and infer private attributes, while retaining
the useful information for the intended cloud service (i.e., im-
age classification). DeepObfuscator includes a learnable en-
coder, namely, obfuscator that is designed to hide privacy-
related sensitive information from the features by performing
our proposed adversarial training algorithm. The proposed al-
gorithm is designed by simulating the game between an at-
tacker who makes efforts to reconstruct raw images and infer
private attributes from the extracted features and a defender
who aims to protect user privacy. Our experiments on CelebA
dataset show that the quality of the reconstructed images from
the obfuscated features of the raw image is dramatically de-
creased from 0.9458 to 0.3175 in terms of multi-scale struc-
tural similarity (MS-SSIM). The person in the reconstructed
image, hence, becomes hardly to be re-identified. The clas-
sification accuracy of the inferred private attributes that can
be achieved by the attacker drops down to a random-guessing
level, e.g., the accuracy of gender is reduced from 97.36% to
58.85%. As a comparison, the accuracy of the intended clas-
sification tasks performed via the cloud service drops by only
2%.
1 Introduction
In the past decade, deep learning has achieved great success
in many computer vision applications, such as face recogni-
tion (Parkhi et al. 2015) and image segmentation (Liu et al.
2015a). However, running deep learning models on mobile
devices is technically challenging due to limited comput-
ing resources. Many large-sized deep-learning-based appli-
cations are often deployed on cloud servers to offer various
services, such as Amazon Rekognition, Microsoft Cognitive
Services, etc. These cloud-based services require users to
send data (e.g., images) to the cloud service provider. How-
ever, this requirement raises users’ concern about privacy
leakage, since various private information may be contained
in the images (e.g., age, gender, etc.). One widely adopted
solution to address this privacy issue is to upload only the ex-
tracted features rather than the raw image (Osia et al. 2017;
Osia et al. 2018). Unfortunately, the extracted features still
contain rich information which can breach users’ privacy.
Specifically, an attacker can exploit the eavesdropped fea-
tures to reconstruct the raw image, and hence the person on
the raw image can be re-identified from the reconstructed
image (Mahendran and Vedaldi 2015).In addition, the ex-
tracted features can also be exploited by an attacker to infer
private attributes, such as gender, age, etc. An attacker, who
may be an authorized internal staff of the service provider
or an external hacker, can perform the above reconstruct at-
tack and private attribute inference by training an adversary
reconstructor and an adversary classifier, respectively. Such
adversary models can be trained by an attacker through con-
tinuously querying the cloud service to collect the eaves-
dropped features as inputs, and the ground truth of the
queried data can be used as the labels.
Encoder Classifier
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Classifier
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Figure 1: An example of reconstruct attack and private at-
tribute leakage in a cloud service for facial attribute recog-
nition.
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Figure 1 shows an example where reconstruct attack and
private attribute leakage occur in a cloud-based facial at-
tribute recognition service. When a mobile user uploads an
image for detecting facial attribute, the encoder will extract
features and then send the features to the cloud server. The
classifier deployed on the server takes the extracted features
as inputs and then predicts whether the person in the re-
ceived image is smiling or not. Note that a complete model
is jointly trained in an end-to-end manner, and then split
into the encoder and the classifier. However, the extracted
features can be eavesdropped by an attacker. By continu-
ously querying the cloud service, the attacker can collect
the eavesdropped features to train an decoder, which is de-
noted as the adversary reconstructor, for recovering the raw
images. Besides, the eavesdropped features can also be ex-
ploited to train an adversary classifier for inferring the pri-
vate attributes associated with the raw images.
There are a few studies have been performed for defend-
ing against reconstruct attacks. They perturbed either the
raw data (He and Cai 2017) or the extracted features (Osia
et al. 2017; Osia et al. 2018) through adding random noises.
But these methods inevitably incur accuracy drop. Feutry et
al. (Feutry et al. 2018) also propose an image anonymiza-
tion approach to hide sensitive features related to private at-
tributes. However, none of these previous studies has inves-
tigated whether defending against only reconstruct attack or
private attribute leakage is inclusive to each other. Our ex-
periments demonstrate that defending only reconstruct at-
tack cannot prevent private attribute leakage, and vice versa.
For example, Figure 2 shows two examples of reconstructed
images when we defend against only either the reconstruct
attack or private attribute leakage. The column (a) shows
the raw images, and the column (b) displays the recon-
structed images when we defend only private attribute leak-
age. These reconstructed images still contain many details
of raw images, and allow an attacker to re-identify the per-
son in the images. The reconstructed images when defending
against only reconstruct attack are shown in the column (c).
Although almost all distinguishable information has been
masked, we can still achieve a 93.7% accuracy in detecting
the gender of the person in the reconstructed images. More
details about this experiment can be found in Section 4.2.
In this work, we propose DeepObfuscator – an adversar-
ial training framework to learn an obfuscator that can hide
sensitive information that can be exploited for reconstruct-
ing raw images and inferring private attributes, and still keep
useful features for image classifications. Although we focus
on image classifications in this paper, DeepObfuscator can
be easily extended to many other tasks, e.g., speech recog-
nition. As Figure 3 shows, DeepObfuscator consists of four
modules: obfuscator, classifier, adversary reconstructor and
adversary classifier. The key idea is to apply adversarial
training for maximizing the reconstruct error of the adver-
sary reconstructor and the classification error of the adver-
sary classifier, but minimizing the classification error of the
classifier.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, DeepObfuscator is the
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Reconstructed images: defending against only pri-
vate attribute leakage vs. defending against only reconstruct
attack. Column (a) is raw images, column (b) shows the re-
constructed images when we defend against only private at-
tribute leakage, and column (c) displays reconstructed im-
ages when defending against only reconstruct attack.
first adversarial training framework that can simultane-
ously defend against both reconstruct attack and private
attribute leakage while maintaining the accuracy of image
classifications;
2. We are the first to experimentally demonstrate that de-
fending against only the reconstruct attack or private at-
tribute leakage is not inclusive to each other;
3. We quantitatively evaluate DeepObfuscator on CelebA
dataset. The results show that the quality of reconstructed
images from the obfuscated features is significantly de-
creased from 0.9458 to 0.3175 in terms of MS-SSIM, in-
dicating that the person on the image is hardly to be re-
identified. The classification accuracy of the inferred pri-
vate attributes drops by around 30% to a random-guessing
accuracy, but the accuracy of the intended classification
tasks performed via the cloud service drops by only 2%.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 reviews the related
work. Section 3 elaborates the design of DeepObfuscator.
Section 4 evaluates the performance of DeepObfuscator.
Section 5 concludes this work.
2 Related Work
Some works have been done to realize privacy-preserving
image classifications. One common solution is so-called
perturbation-based approach, which modifies raw data be-
fore sending them to the service provider, such as adding
random noise (Dwork et al. 2017), down-sampling (Ryoo
et al. 2017), replacing the identity of a face (Jourabloo,
Yin, and Liu 2015), etc. However, these solutions are task-
specific, meaning that they need to carefully pre-analyze the
intended classification tasks and only perturb the features
feature maps
intended classification task
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Figure 3: The design of DeepObfuscator.
that are not related to the intended tasks. Recent works ap-
ply deep learning techniques to protect the privacy of raw
images. Osia et al. (Osia et al. 2017; Osia et al. 2018) de-
sign a client-server paradigm by splitting a complete con-
volutional neural network (CNN) model into a feature ex-
tractor and a classifier. The extracted features will be sent
to the classifier deployed on the server instead of send-
ing raw images. Noise is also added to the extracted fea-
tures before sending them to service providers. However,
such solutions incur considerable classification accuracy
drop. Adversarial training (Liu et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2018;
Kim et al. 2019) is adopted to obfuscate features so that an
attacker cannot reconstruct the raw image from the eaves-
dropped features. Feutry et al. (Feutry et al. 2018) also pro-
pose an adversarial training algorithm to hide the sensitive
information from features so that private attributes cannot
be inferred from the obfuscated features.
Unfortunately, none of the existing works can simultane-
ously defend against both reconstruct attack and private at-
tribute leakage, generating significant concern on the data
user privacy in such scenario. Our proposed DeepObfusca-
tor is designed solve this issue.
3 Design of DeepObfuscator
As Figure 3 shows, DeepObfuscator consists of three addi-
tional neural network modules: classifier (C), adversary re-
constructor (AR) and adversary classifier (AC). The clas-
sifier works for the intended classification service. The ad-
versary reconstructor and adversary classifier simulate an
attacker in the adversarial training procedure, aiming to
recover raw images and infer private attributes from the
eavesdropped features. All the four modules are end-to-end
trained using our proposed adversarial training algorithm.
Before presenting the details of each module, we give the
following notations. We denote D = {I1, . . . , IN} as the
images in the dataset, where N is the number of images,
and D′ = {I ′1, . . . , I ′N} represents the reconstructed im-
ages that are generated by the adversary reconstructor. Let
Y = {Y1, . . . , YM} denote the set of the target classes that
the classifier is trained to predict, and Yi = {yi1, . . . , yiN}
denotes the corresponding labels of each class. Similarly,
we adopt Z = {Z1, . . . , ZK} to denote the set of pri-
vate classes that the adversary classifier aims to infer, and
Zi = {zi1, . . . , ziN} denotes the corresponding labels of
each private class.
3.1 Obfuscator
The obfuscator (O) is a typical encoder which consists of an
input layer, multiple convolutional layers, max-pooling lay-
ers and batch-normalization layers. The obfuscator is trained
to hide privacy-related information while retaining useful in-
formation for intended classification tasks.
3.2 Classifier
The classifier (C) is jointly trained with the obfuscator as a
complete CNN model. A service provider can choose any
neural network architecture for the classifier based on task
requirements and available computing resources. In Deep-
Obfuscator, we adopt a popular CNN architecture VGG16
(Simonyan and Zisserman 2014), and split it into the obfus-
cator and the classifier.
The performance of the classifier C is measured using the
cross-entropy loss function, which is expressed as:
L(C) = −
N∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
yij log(y
′
ij)+(1−yij)log(1−y′ij), (1)
where (y1j , . . . , yMj) denote the ground truth labels for the
jth data sample, and (y′1j , . . . , y
′
Mj) are the corresponding
predictions. Therefore, the obfuscator and the classifier can
be optimized by minimizing the above loss function as:
θo, θc = argmin
θo,θc
L(C), (2)
where θo and θc are the parameters of the obfuscator and
classifier, respectively.
3.3 Adversary Classifier
By continuously querying the cloud service, an attacker can
train the adversary classifier (AC) using the eavesdropped
features as inputs and the interested private attributes as la-
bels. An attacker can infer private attributes via feeding the
eavesdropped features to the trained adversary classifier. In
DeepObfuscator, we apply the same architecture to both the
classifier and the adversary classifier. However, the attacker
can choose any architecture for the adversary classifier. As
we shall show in Section 4.4, the performance of using dif-
ferent architectures in both the classifier and the adversary
classifier will not be significantly different from the one that
is achieved using the same architecture.
Similar to the classifier, the performance of the adversary
classifier AC is also measured using the cross-entropy loss
function as:
L(AC) = −
N∑
j=1
K∑
i=1
zij log(z
′
ij)+(1−zij)log(1−z′ij), (3)
where (z1j , . . . , zMj) denote the ground truth labels for the
jth eavesdropped feature, and (z′1j , . . . , z
′
Mj) stand for the
corresponding predictions. When we simulate an attacker
who tries to enhance the accuracy of the adversary classi-
fier as high as possible, the adversary classifier needs to be
optimized by minimizing the above loss function as:
θac = argmin
θac
L(AC), (4)
where θac is the parameter set of the adversary classifier.
On the contrary, when defending against private attribute
leakage, we train the obfuscator in our proposed adversarial
training procedure that aims to degrade the performance of
the adversary classifier while improving the accuracy of the
classifier. Consequently, the obfuscator can be trained using
Eq. 5 when simulating a defender:
θo = argmin
θo
L(C)− λ1L(AC), (5)
where λ1 is a tradeoff parameter.
3.4 Adversary Reconstructor
The adversary reconstructor (AR), which is trained to re-
cover the raw image from the eavesdropped features, also
plays an attacker role. The attacker can apply any neural
network architecture in the adversary reconstructor design.
However, the worst case happens when an attacker knows
the architecture of the obfuscator, and then builds the most
powerful reconstructor, i.e., an exactly mirrored obfuscator
by performing a layer-to-layer reversion. In DeepObfusca-
tor, we adopt the most powerful reconstructor as the ad-
versary reconstructor. The experiments in Section 4.4 show
our trained obfuscator can successfully defend against re-
construct attack even if an attacker trains the reconstructor
with different neural network architectures.
When playing as an attacker, the adversary reconstructor
is trained to optimize the quality of the reconstructed im-
age Ir as close as the original image Io. In DeepObfuscator,
we adopt MS-SSIM (Wang, Simoncelli, and Bovik 2003;
Ma et al. 2016) to evaluate the performance of the adversary
reconstructor, which is expressed as:
L(AR1) = 1−MS-SSIM(Io, Ir). (6)
MS-SSIM values range between 0 and 1. The higher the
MS-SSIM value is, the more perceptually similarity can be
found between the two compared images, indicating better
quality of the reconstructed images. Consequently, an at-
tacker can optimize the adversary reconstructor as:
θar = argmin
θar
L(AR1), (7)
where θar is the parameter set of the adversary reconstructor.
On the contrary, a defender expects to degrade the quality of
the reconstructed image as much as possible. To this end,
we generate one additional Gaussian noise image Inoise.
The adversary reconstructor is trained to make each recon-
structed image similar to Inoise but different from Io, and the
performance of the classifier should be maintained. When
playing as a defender, the obfuscator can be trained as:
L(AR2) = 1−MS-SSIM(Inoise, Ir) (8)
θo = argmin
θo
L(C) + λ2(L(AR2)− L(AR1)), (9)
where λ2 is a tradeoff parameter.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training Algorithm
Input: Dataset D
Output: θo, θc, θar, θac
1: Input: Dataset D
2: for every epoch do
3: for every four batches do
4: if batch idx mod 4 == 0 then
5: Defend against AR:
6: L(C) + L(AR2)− L(AR1)→ update O(θo)
7: else if batch idx mod 4 == 1 then
8: Defend against AC:
9: L(C)− L(AC)→ update O(θo)
10: else if batch idx mod 4 == 2 then
11: Reconstruct attack:
12: L(AR1)→ update AR(θar)
13: Infer private attributes:
14: L(AC)→ update AC(θac)
15: else
16: Recover C:
17: L(C)→ update C(θc)
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
3.5 Adversarial Training Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed four-stage adver-
sarial training algorithm. Before performing the adversarial
training, we first jointly train the obfuscator and the classifier
without privacy concern to obtain the optimal performance
on the intended classification tasks. Similarly, we also pre-
train the adversary classifier and adversary reconstructor for
initialization. As Algorithm 1 shows, within each epoch of
training, each adversarial training iteration consists of four
batches. In the first two batches, we train the obfuscator to
defend against the adversary reconstructor and the adver-
sary classifier while keeping the classifier unchanged. For
the third batch, we optimize the adversary reconstructor and
the adversary classifier by simulating an attacker, but the pa-
rameters of the obfuscator and the classifier are fixed. Fi-
nally, we optimize the classifier to improve the classification
accuracy on the intended tasks.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experiment Setup
We implement DeepObfuscator with PyTorch, and train it
on a server with 4×NVIDIA TITAN RTX GPUs. We apply
mini-batch technique in training with a batch size of 64, and
adopt the AdamOptimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) with an
adaptive learning rate in all four stages in the adversarial
training procedure. We set tradeoff parameters λ1 = λ2 = 1
in our experiments. The architecture configurations of each
module are presented in Table 1.
We adopt CelebA (Liu et al. 2015b) for the training and
testing of DeepObfuscator. CelebA consists more than 200K
face images. Each face image is labeled with 40 binary facial
attributes. The dataset is split into 160K images for training
and 40K images for testing.
Table 1: The architecture configurations of each module.
Obfuscator Adversary
Reconstructor
Classifier & Adver-
sary Classifier
conv3-64 Upsample 3×conv3-256
conv3-64 deconv3-128 maxpool
maxpool deconv3-64 3×conv3-512
conv3-128 Upsample maxpool
conv3-128 deconv3-64 3×conv3-512
maxpool deconv3-3 maxpool
2×FC-4096
FC-label length
sigmoid
4.2 Motivation
Before presenting our performance evaluations, we first ver-
ify our motivation that defending against only reconstruct
attack or private attribute leakage is not inclusive to each
other. We apply our proposed adversarial training algorithm
to defend against only one of them each time, and evaluate
the attack performance on the other. In this experiment, we
select ‘gender’ as the private attribute. The results presented
in Section 1 verified our motivation.
One naı¨ve solution of the exclusion of defending against
reconstruct attack and private attribute leakage is to first train
an obfuscator to defend against one of these two scenar-
ios using the adversarial training approach, and then con-
tinue to train the obfuscator to defend against the other one.
However, this naı¨ve solution can not simultaneously defend
against both the scenarios because the parameters of the ob-
fuscator keep updated in the second step. The above limita-
tion motivates the design of DeepObfuscator.
4.3 Baselines
Two baseline models are selected to compare with our de-
sign in the experiments. The first baseline model is directly
adding Gaussian noise (Dwork et al. 2017; He and Cai 2017)
onto the raw images so that the image quality is degraded
until it becomes just unrecognizable. This baseline model
makes sure that the classification accuracy is affected as less
as possible. The second baseline model has the same archi-
tectures as the DeepObfuscator but is trained without using
our proposed adversarial training approach.
4.4 Effectiveness of Defending Against
Reconstruct Attack
We quantitatively evaluate the quality of reconstructed im-
ages and validate the quantitative results through a human
perceptual study. Before showing quantitative results, we
perform an experiment to simulate reconstruct attack using
different reconstructor architectures. As introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4, we adopt the most powerful decoder, i.e., exactly
the reverse of the obfuscator, as the adversary reconstruc-
tor for training. However, an attacker may not be able to
know the architecture of the obfuscator, and hence the at-
tacker may make a brute-force attack using the reconstructor
with different architectures. We implement three additional
Table 2: Adversary reconstructor configurations.
URec#1 URec#2 ResRec
Input (54×44×128 feature maps)
conv3-64
conv3-64
conv3-64
conv3-64
conv3-64
transconv3-64[
3× 3, 64
3× 3, 64
]
×2
Upsample
conv3-128
conv3-128
conv3-128
conv3-128
conv3-128
[
3× 3, 64
3× 3, 64
]
×2
Upsample
conv3-256
conv3-256
conv3-256
conv3-256
conv3-256 conv1-3
conv3-3
conv1-3
conv3-3
conv1-3 sigmoid
sigmoid sigmoid
reconstructors as attackers in our experiments. The architec-
tural configurations of those reconstructors are presented in
Table 2. URec#1 and URec#2 are built based on the archi-
tecture of U-net (Ronneberger, Fischer, and Brox 2015), and
ResRec is implemented using ResNet (He et al. 2016) ar-
chitecture. Each reconstructor is separately trained with the
same pre-trained obfuscator.
We adopt the MS-SSIM to evaluate the quality of the re-
constructed images that are generated by each reconstructor,
i.e., comparing the similarity between the reconstructed im-
age and the corresponding raw image. A smaller value of
MS-SSIM means less similarity between the reconstructed
image and the raw image, indicating a more effective de-
fense against reconstruct attacks. Table 3 presents the aver-
age MS-SSIM for attacking reconstructors on testing data.
The results show that although we apply the mirrored ob-
fuscator architecture for the adversary reconstructor when
training the obfuscator, the trained obfuscator can effectively
defend against reconstruct attacks no matter what kinds of
architecture are adopted by an attacker in the reconstructor
design.
Table 3: MS-SSIM for different attack reconstructors.
Training Reconstructor Attack ReconstructorAR in DeepObfuscator URec#1 URec#2 ResRec
AR in DeepObfuscator 0.3175 0.3123 0.3095 0.3169
Quantitative Evaluation. In addition to MS-SSIM, we
also adopt the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) – a widely
used metric of image quality, to evaluate the quality of the
reconstructed images. In this experiment, the obfuscator is
trained by setting the intended classification task as ‘smile’
and the private attribute as ‘gender’. Smaller values of MS-
SSIM and PSNR indicate a stronger defense against recon-
struct attack. Table 4 presents the average MS-SSIM and
PSNR on the testing data of DeepObfuscator and two base-
line models. The result shows that DeepObfuscator is the
most effective one to defend against reconstruct attack and
the baseline model without adversarial training can hardly
hide privacy information from the features. Figure 4 illus-
trates several examples of the reconstructed images. With
our proposed adversarial training, the images that are re-
constructed from the obfuscated features become unrecog-
nizable. Even though directly adding noise to raw image
can hide more private information than the baseline model
without adversarial training, the person in the image that is
reconstructed from noisy features can still be re-identified.
In summary, both quantitative evaluations and visual results
show that DeepObfuscator can effectively defend against re-
construct attack.
Table 4: Average PSNR and MS-SSIM for DeepObfuscator
and two baseline models.
Metric DeepObfuscator Baseline (without adversarial training) Baseline (noise)
MS-SSIM 0.3175 0.9458 0.7263
PSNR 6.32 27.81 16.97
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Figure 4: The comparison between reconstructed images
with DeepObfuscator and two baseline models.
Human Perceptual Study. We also conduct an online hu-
man perceptual study to directly examine whether a person
in a reconstructed image can be re-identified by humans.
This study consists of 10 questions, each of which includes
one reconstructed image and four raw images as options.
One of the four options contains the person in the recon-
structed image. Participants are instructed to choose the op-
tion that looks like the person the most in the reconstructed
image. Figure 5 shows one example question in the sur-
vey. It is very difficult to find hints from the reconstructed
image to identify the correct answer, i.e., Figure 5(e). We
collect 40 responses in total for this study. The average re-
identification accuracy of 10 questions is 28%, which is very
close to a random guess, i.e., 25% for 4 options. Further-
more, we can imagine if there is no option offered to an at-
tacker, it will become more challenging to re-identify the
person from the reconstructed image alone.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 5: An example question of the human perceptual
study. (a) is the reconstructed image, and (b)-(e) are the four
options.
4.5 Effectiveness of Defending Against Private
Attribute Leakage
We compare the performance of the classifier and the ad-
versary classifier which are trained in the way adopted by
DeepObfuscator and two baseline models. Specifically, we
choose detecting ‘smile’ and ‘high cheekbone’ as the in-
tended classification tasks, and ‘gender’ and ‘heavy makeup’
as the private attributes that the attacker aims to infer from
the obfuscated features. We design 6 testing sets using dif-
ferent combinations of those attributes: (1) {smile, gender};
(2) {high cheekbone, gender}; (3) {smile, high cheekbone,
gender}; (4) {smile, gender, heavy makeup}; (5) {high
cheekbone, gender, heavy makeup}; (6) {smile, high cheek-
bone, gender, heavy makeup}. In fact, those six testing sets
can be divided into two groups: the first three sets only con-
tain one private attribute, and the last three sets include two
private attributes. Within each group, we explore how the
different numbers of the intended classification tasks will af-
fect the protection of the private attributes. In addition, if we
compare each testing set between two groups accordingly,
we can investigate how the accuracy of the intended tasks
will change with the number of the private attributes that
need to be protected.
Figure 6 shows the training loss of the classifier L(C), the
adversary classifier L(AC) and the adversary reconstruc-
tor L(AR). The loss is recorded every 100 batches during
the adversarial training procedure. In general, L(AC) and
L(AR) significantly increase from 0.02 to 0.6 with the ad-
versarial training procedure, indicating a significant perfor-
mance drop of the adversary classifier and the adversary re-
constructor. On the contrary, L(C) increases slightly, imply-
ing a small performance drop.
Figure 7 shows the average accuracy of intended tasks and
private attributes using the classifier and adversary classifier
which are trained in the way adopted by DeepObfuscator
and two baseline models, respectively. With the proposed
adversarial training, DeepObfuscator can effectively prevent
private labels from being inferred by an attacker while only
incurring a small accuracy drop on the intended classifica-
tion tasks. For example, Figure 7(a) shows that the accuracy
of ‘gender’ dramatically decreases from 97.36% to 58.85%,
while the accuracy of ‘smile’ only drops by 1.15%. On the
contrary, the baseline model that adding noise to the raw im-
age defends against private attribute leakage much less ef-
fectively, but incurring a much larger performance drop on
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Figure 6: Training loss for each testing set.
the intended tasks: as illustrated by Figure 7(a), the accu-
racy of ‘gender’ only decreases from 97.36% to 90.15% so
that the private attribute can still be effectively inferred with
high confidence. The accuracy of ‘smile’ significantly drops
by 5.36%.
If we compare Figure 7(c) vs. Figure 7(a-b) and Figure
7(f) vs. Figure 7(d-e), it can be observed that performing
more intended tasks will weaken the defense against private
attribute leakage due to the intrinsic correlation between the
intended tasks and the private attributes that an attacker aims
to infer. Specifically, the accuracy of ‘gender’ slightly in-
creases from 58.85% in Figure 7(a) and 59.79% in Figure
7(b) to 63.96% in Figure 7(c). Similarly, the accuracy of
‘gender’ and ‘heavy makeup’ increase by 1% from Figure
7(d-e) to Figure 7(f). In addition, by comparing Figure 7(a-
c) vs. Figure 7(d-f), we found that protecting more private
attributes leads to slight decrease in the accuracy of the in-
tended tasks. For example, the accuracy of ‘smile’ slightly
decreases from 91.53% in Figure 7(a) to 90.85% in Figure
7(d). The reason is that the feature related to the private at-
tributes has some intrinsic correlations to the feature related
to the intended tasks. Therefore, more correlated features
may be hidden if more private attributes need to be pro-
tected. As a result, the performance of the intended tasks
becomes harder to be maintained.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 7: Accuracy of intended tasks and private attributes
using DeepObfuscator and baseline models.
5 Conclusion
We proposed an adversarial training framework DeepObfus-
cator for privacy-preserving image classifications by simul-
taneously defending against both reconstruct attack and pri-
vate attribute leakage. DeepObfuscator consists of an obfus-
cator, a classifier, an adversary reconstructor and an adver-
sary classifier. The obfuscator is trained using our proposed
end-to-end adversarial training algorithm to hide sensitive
information which can be exploited to reconstruct raw im-
ages and infer private attributes by an attacker. Useful fea-
tures for the intended classification tasks can still be retained
by the obfuscator. The adversary reconstructor and adver-
sary classifier play an attacker role in the adversarial train-
ing procedure, aiming to reconstruct the raw image and infer
private attributes from the eavesdropped features. Evalua-
tions on CelebA dataset show that the quality of the recon-
structed images from the obfuscated features is significantly
decreased from 0.9458 to 0.3175 in terms of MS-SSIM, in-
dicating the person on the re-constructed images is hardly to
be re-identified. The classification accuracy of the inferred
private attributes that can be achieved by the attacker drops
by around 30% to a random-guessing level, but the accu-
racy of the intended classification tasks performed via the
cloud service drops by only 2%. Although DeepObfuscator
is applied to image classifications in this paper, it can be eas-
ily extended to many other deep-learning-based applications
such as speech recognition.
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